James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

10-21-1999

DDASaccident404
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident404" (1999). Global CWD Repository. 604.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/604

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/03/2004

Accident number: 404

Accident time: 09:10

Accident Date: 21/10/1999

Where it occurred: Hotonj, Vogosca,
Sarjevo Canton

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: MAC/QA/1000/RS

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Date of main report: 02/11/1999
Name of source: TJ/NH

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: KB1 submunition

Ground condition: building rubble
residential/urban

Date record created: 16/03/2004

Date last modified: 17/03/2004

No of victims: 2

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)

Accident report
No formal accident report has been made available (March 2004). The accident was deemed
an “incident” despite occurring to a group engaged in demining and while they were at work,
which makes it an “accident” according to IMAS definitions. The accident occurred before the
current IMAS were published, which presumably explains the reversed use of the terms. The
following document from the Bosnia Herzegovina MAC was made available in 2003. It has
been edited for anonymity.
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Demining incident 21/10/99 - Lesson Learned
2nd November 1999, MAC QA/1000/RB
INTRODUCTION
1. BH MAC to conduct and investigation on the circumstances of the incident that happened
at the site ID 10228, Hotonj, Vogosca, Sarajevoo Canton, Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina convened a Board of Inquiry. Incident was initially reported by SFOR.
2. Two persons suffered minor injuries in this incident.

SUMMARY
3. Demining incident occurred on October 21st 1999 at 09:10 hours in the very vicinity of the
control point, approximately 120 metres away from the active minefield. Weather was windy
and cloudy. Rest area is a 20 square metre area in front of a devastated house, while the part
of the rest area is one of the rooms in the very house, cleared as well. The area by the rest
area is mined and marked with 1.5m high pickets and a mine tape attached to each. There
were four persons wearing no PPE at the rest area at the moment. The site itself is constantly
supervised by SFOR.
A roof of the devastated house is burnt so there were pieces of metal parapets left on sides.
Incident was due to a piece of parapet that fell to the ground and activated KB1 cluster bomb.
The fallen piece of parapet and the wall of the house took almost all the bomblets [fragments]
from KB1. One of them injured an SFOR supervisor in the upper part of his thigh while a
deminer was injured under a rib. These were all minor injuries and the bomblets [fragments]
were taken out in the hospital. The medic was close to the incident site as well so the injured
were given first aid and taken to hospital in a very short period of time.

CONCLUSION
4. The site is located in an urban area where the areas where people live are mined.
Backyards are cleared according to priorities so there are lots of mined areas in between,
which is of great danger for the inhabitants.
5. Five (5) cluster bombs [submunitions] were found at the same spot. They were not
destroyed in situ since it is the urban area so that the police forbade destruction. They had to
be disarmed and removed to the demolition area.
6. Operational site being very narrow, safety distances allowed only one two-man team
working at a time, while the rest of deminers were either at the control point or the rest area.

RECOMMENDATIONS
7. Since these teams are not house clearance teams, which is a big problem in an urban
area, the training of deminers for house clearance should be done. Every cleared backyard
would include the house clearance and such unfortunate incidents could be avoided.
8. Tasks should be issued as a whole, so that administrative areas could be located inside
the safe area and therefore minimise the dangers for civilians,

Signed: AD Coordination BH MAC

Victim Report
Victim number: 521

Name: Name removed
(SFOR-1)
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Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Leg
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 522

Name: Name removed
(SFOR-2)
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Chest
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this incident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the demining
group established their rest area inside a property they presumably believed was safe. The
report does state that the “room” in the house had been “cleared as well” so presumably the
KB1 fell to the floor with the rubble that fell into the house from the roof.
The report identified a lack of appropriate training in its recommendations, so the secondary
cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. Both the primary and secondary causes could be
considered to be “Management/control inadequacies” because the responsibility for ensuring
that appropriate surveys are made and adequate training is given lies high in the command
chain.
Despite the report stating that the Victim's injuries were minor, the fragments had to be
surgically removed and all injuries requiring surgery are classed as "severe" in this database.
It is not clear why the details of this accident have not been made available. The fact that the
victims were serving SFOR soldiers may have made the accident details “sensitive” but the
lessons to be derived form the accident were relevant to all.
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